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Abstract
The Berlin Conference of 1885 has influenced the way native Africans, and the
African Diaspora live their daily lives. France contractually controls several resources
generated by the continent of Africa. Herein lies a technical proposal to free Africa
from the financial and economic agreements coerced upon the continent over a century
ago by utilizing decentralized collaboration through advanced technology. AfricaOS
(AOS) aims to provide a philosophical, and fundamental framework for implementing
a simple, distributed, collaborative computer for agreement amongst peers. The work
also demonstrates an algebra over transactions, use of the protocol for privatization, a
method for tokenizing barter economies, and methods to design mechanisms for use in
implementing protocol behavior.
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Foreword
The effects of the Berlin Conference of 1885 on the continent of Africa, and its
diaspora have been studied by scholars for decades. Colonization of any environment
impacts the future of that area, its people, and the posterity of its people. Financial
impact of the Berlin Conference has led to the manipulation of the financial future of
the entire continent. A large group of West African countries plan to adopt a single fiat
currency, called the Eco, thus reforming the CFA Franc.
The Eco is an attempt to free the continent from effects of colonialism as Paris will
no longer co-manage the currency. Foreign exchange reserves will no longer be central-
ized by France and the obligation to pay 50% of these reserves to the French Treasury
operating account will no longer be in effect. However, with the current geopolitical
climate, and zeitgeist, implementing a fiat currency that is centralized comes with a set
of problems of which can have the same level of impact as colonialism. The Banque de
France will remain the guarantor and regulator of converting the Eco to the Euro. They
will also maintain a fixed parity between the two currencies. This centralized party will
still have a large influence on the long-term ramifications of this deal.
With the advancements today, the entire continent of Africa can use modern
financial technologies to circumvent these centralized concerns. It is my belief that it
makes more practical sense, is more sustainable in the long-term, and future-proof to
implement an open, neutral, decentralized, borderless, and censorship resistant digital
currencies to sever the long-standing, economic grasp of colonialism on the continent of
Africa. Herein lies a proposed, distributed, operating system with which to power the
next generation of African economic empowerment. This system can be used toward
liberation of any economy under the same economic grasp, but the continent is a perfect
initial testing bed for this focused mission.
At the time of writing, the Novel Corona Virus, COVID-19, has not only been
spreading across the planet, but has also been bringing unprecedented challenges to
several countries. The economic state of the world is under an attack by a novel, invisible
enemy. Governments are putting forth stimulus packages, and attempting to inject
money into their respective systems, and deliver money directly to their constituents.
The price of Bitcoin has been nearly cut in half since the number of corona virus cases
has spread so widely. It is at times like this where we realize the amount of reliance the
general public has on government programs, and the currency of their nation. In my
opinion, this will mark a changing point in our economic expectations of which will be
similar to the time Satoshi Nakamoto introduced the Bitcoin project. Populations need
to regain sovereignty from their nation’s money, and must also obtain the capability to
introduce their own supported means of economic transactions into the world without
the need to spend years on research & development.
"For to be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way
that respects and enhances the freedom of others." - Nelson Mandela
3
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Background
This protocol is the first direct at-
tempt to practically provide a technolog-
ical framework for alleviating the financial
ramifications brought about by the Berlin
Conference of 1885.
2.1 The Berlin Conference
Otherwise known as the West African
Conference, the Berlin Conference [1][2][3]
is among the most important events in
African History influencing the lives of
many today. Historical scholars have at-
tributed much of the formalized coloniza-
tion of Africa to this event. This was not
the only attempt at formalizing Africa’s
colonization, but has contributed to colo-
nization becoming less ad hoc, and more
organized among colonialists.
Liquidity
There exists a liquidity problem in sev-
eral "impoverished" countries on the con-
tinent. I use the term "impoverished" be-
cause although the environment may not
facilitate a large amount of fiat-based eco-
nomic trade, it may sit upon a wealth of
natural resources. With Africa being one of
the most resource-rich places on the planet,
there should not exist such a large and
widespread problem of liquidity.
3.1 The Problem
The problem exists where many in-
dividuals simply do not have access to
money. Additionally, if money does exists,
it may be under the control of externalities.
With the advent of digital currencies, lack
of implementation is the only reason why
an independent environment cannot create
a currency of their own to facilitate eco-
nomic activity. With the internet, the en-
vironment can even expose access to the
created currency to the outside world, and
decide upon the distributed rules governing
the environment’s economy.
With colonial influence on the economy
of several countries, France possesses the
power to manipulate the french-based fiat
currencies used by french-colonized coun-
tries. Today, France is granted financial
reserves from African countries of which is
used within the french financial markets.
These reserves given to France are not al-
lowed to be retrieved in full by the African
countries, but are only allowed to be bor-
rowed against as a loan, at a specified in-
terest rate.
Figure 1: An (AOS) setup, exposing mul-
tiple separate instances of ecosystems, with
separate networks
Market Creation
AfricaOS (AOS), illustrated in figure
1, extends the ability for any one per-
son, group of people, or entities, to foster
their own markets with their own market
4
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rules. Bitcoin enabled a person, or group
to create their own currency, as long as
they could provide or garner nodes to sup-
port their network. However, the underly-
ing logic for bitcoin is difficult to change,
and not friendly to non-technologists. Over
time, developers have figured out ways to
alter Bitcoin to meet their needs, and even
going as far as changing core functional-
ity. AOS contains mechanisms to go beyond
the generation of a currency by abstracting
away the purpose of the collaboration, and
how value is derived in the system.
A valuable currency underlying dis-
tributed collaboration provides incentive
for participants to elicit desired behavior
within the system. Underpinning a net-
work with a currency has its benefits, al-
though economic transactions may not be
the sole purpose of the network.
An effect of market creation is enabling
individuals to create markets within which
they themselves can participate, the goal
being income generation, and facilitating
trade. Moreover, market creation, and par-
ticipation allows for someone to move their
income from the labor market, to the cap-
ital market.
Mobile Money
Mobile Money [9] is the concept of
individuals having access to banking ser-
vices through simple, non internet-enabled
phones. In more developed ecosystems, a
person may have access to a smart phone,
and a mobile application for a bank.
Mobile money allows any mobile sub-
scriber to add credit to his or her mobile
account and store it for later use or send it
to other mobile subscribers via short mes-
saging service SMS. The receiver can inex-
pensively convert this credit back into cash.
Mobile money allows users to send cash as
quickly as a text message, avoiding incon-
venient and costly transfer methods such
as physical travel, the mail, or traditional
money transfer services like Western Union
[9].
Through mobile money, a person can
facilitate their banking needs on-the-go.
For less developed environments, where
smart phones are not abundant, mobile
money allows for an equal amount of
banking opportunity. Several countries in
Africa have already adopted several uses
for mobile money in practice.
5.1 Mobile Minutes
Mobile minutes are purchased by in-
dividuals to support simple telecommuni-
cations activities, such as calling another
phone number. However, telecommunica-
tions companies have began to purchase re-
maining mobile minutes from minute hold-
ers, for the purpose of "reselling" them
back to the public. This has inadvertently
created market demand in which individ-
uals facilitate trade amongst each other
since possessing mobile minutes yields eco-
nomic opportunity.
Economic Impact
Today, individual vendors, and sell-
ers of goods accept mobile minutes as pay-
ment, because they are liquid. This form
of "money" contributes to these environ-
ments being perfect testing beds for in-
novation regarding digital currencies. To-
day, to the average user of mobile money
in these countries, using a digital currency
can seem natural.
5.2 SMS
Mobile money, is still a widely used
medium of commerce on the continent. To
enable easier commerce, nodes within the
network are supplemented with SIP trunks
to accept SMS messages as transaction in-
vocations.
For example, if Alice wants to send
a transaction to Bob, she can send an
SMS message to the network, from which
a transaction is constructed. There is a
simple mapping of addresses to numbers,
upon which more features are to be added.
This process also brings about the need
for secure, and reliable address-phone num-
ber mapping methods. The entry point for
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SMS is not a core protocol feature, but di-
rectly addresses internet requirements for
the proposed system to function, and re-
main "available" to network participants.
Tokenized Bartering
While bartering, sellers perform eco-
nomic transactions within a physical mar-
ketplace. However, goods can only be sold
to other buyers in the same physical mar-
ketplace. Depending on the type of good,
surpluses may result in perished items from
the sellers perspective. These perished
items may result in guaranteed financial
loss for the seller.
6.1 Tokenizing a good
Shown in figure 2, a member owning a
set of coins can exchange them with any-
one, for any good they wish to obtain. If an
individual has a good, but no coins, they
will not be able to participate in the under-
lying market. Gaining entry into the mar-
ket requires a member to obtain units of
an asset represented within the market. A
member with no coins, can exchange their
goods with a coin-possessing member, and
thus gain entry. This is similar to someone
exchanging a digital currency for anything
they see as valuable. In this sense the coin
holder is shown as a market making clerk.
The method through which a market mak-
ing clerk obtains coins is arbitrary. They
can earn coins, or have coins given to them
by coin holders.
By providing exchange for a market’s
currency, the member who sells their coins
becomes a gatekeeper to the market, for a
coinless, good holder. This enables market
participants to setup businesses purposed
with providing access to market assets. By
tokenizing a good, sellers can trade with
their surplus, and we can abstract the util-
ity of a good. Buyers of a good can still ex-
change their goods for other goods of their
choice, but also has the option of strate-
gizing to maximize profit, and leverage –
similar to traditional financial markets.
6.2 Market Making
Market Makers exist in every financial
market. An individual, or entity, can pro-
vide market making services to the mar-
ket. By setting up, and bootstrapping the
markets continuation, an entity or group
then become market makers. The Mar-
ket Maker also has an inherent incentive
to protect their value in the market. Mar-
ket Makers must view the value given to
a person seeking coins as proportional to
the market value of the coins given to the
person.
A useful analogy for this is a pawn
shop exchanging dollars to a seller of a
good being pawned. The pawn shop clerks
inspect the good before exchanging value
with the seller. This also incentivizes mar-
ket marker competition to create and sup-
port a market network.
In the traditional financial markets,
Market Makers are individuals, and enti-
ties who own enough capital to influence
the markets. This creates a situation of
exclusivity with respect to Market Making.
Allowing more competition for fair market
making widens the door for several other
individuals and entities interested in sup-
port their own markets.
At the time of this paper, some of
the largest cryptocurrency exchanges have
began to offer Market Making services to
their enterprise users. AOS enables Market
Making as a Service (MMaaS) to barter-
ing markets. This is one approach to to-
kenized bartering of physical goods. Cap-
turing any metadata related to the good
further enables the integrity of its represen-
tation within the network to better mirror
reality, although there is no process today
through which we can convert 100% of a
physical good into a digital good.
Another method could make use of a
good holder demonstrating physical own-
ership of the good when they receive coins,
and upon exporting their coins from the
system, through clerks. A clerk is less
incentivized to provide coins to an entity
without being able to verify the entity pos-
sesses the value in physical goods. This ap-
proach allows clerks to be relieved from the
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Figure 2: Entry workflow for good holders to tokenize goods for digital, economic
exchange
duty of housing goods. More schemes for
tokenizing assets exist through academic
publications, and even patents [11], but lit-
tle is covered on the actual workflow of se-
curely representing a general physical asset
as a digital asset. However, there exists ex-
tensive academic literature on a posteriori
processes once an asset becomes tokenized
and digital.
Representing physical goods
Unless the literature defines a uni-
versal way to automatically exchange an
arbitrary unit of value with a physical
good, a manual transaction must be ac-
complished. However, security vulnerabili-
ties exists with every human transaction.
This manual approach to representing
physical goods as digital goods is simply to
gain access to a market’s network through
the exchange of a physical good. Simply
participating in economic transactions only
requires a trader possess an asset being
used on that market’s network. There is
more work to be done in universal mecha-
nisms to exchange value of a physical good
for a digital good, but this approach is the
most direct.
If Market Maker A creates a mar-
ket with rules too restrictive, or allocates
themselves too many coins, potential mar-
ket participants can choose Market Maker
B, or Market Maker n, but for the same
market. This creates an opportunity to
create a network for anyone with access to
commodity hardware.
6.3 Multichain Exchange
With many physical markets, there
must exist many digital markets. A fu-
ture with one global market currency seems
unlikely, but not impossible. If multi-
ple digital networks exist, enabling eco-
nomic transactions to span across markets,
and across networks is important. With
AOS, the goal is to create standalone pro-
grammatic markets, and cryptoeconomies.
With the same underlying protocol fab-
ric, we can connect multiple markets, de-
spite them using different assets. Purpose-
fully, we abstract away the Asset Exchange
Mechanism.
If asset x from market X wants to
be exchanged with asset y from market
Y , we must first create a transaction on
each network to represent the asset be-
ing transferred, and another transaction
on the other market signifying the paired-
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asset being received.
A simple approach would be for the
exchange to take into account the asset’s
current price, and the paired-asset’s cur-
rent price. Using these two values, we can
provide a direct conversion. The conver-
sion rate can be fixed, dynamic, or arrived
upon through network consensus via par-
ticipants from both networks – this scheme
is an arbitrary example, and can be built
upon in future work.
Implementation
To physically realize this system, we
must translate philosophical details into
actual implementation details.
7.1 Proposal Mechanism
The system makes use of the concept
of a proposal, P . In distributed comput-
ing, you can have a system in which a mes-
sage is broadcasted with no intention of
being responded to – this can be seen as
"fire and forget"; UDP is an example of a
"fire and forget" protocol scheme. How-
ever, to achieve truly collaborative com-
puting, communication within a network
should be communicative.
Concretely, this means whenever a
node transmits a message, a receiving node
should respond with information, and the
initial node should compute logic based
on the receiving nodes response. For this
purpose, any amendment to the system’s
"source of truth" is encapsulated within a
proposal.
Defining Proposals
A furtherance of "time" in a decentralized
system like Bitcoin is the creation of a new
block. This adds another unit of time-
sliced activity onto the ever-growing ledger.
Each transaction represents a change in
the state of the system, which can also be
viewed as a progression of time.
In AOS, a proposal is the trigger for
each node to progress time, in the general
sense. A node submits a proposal to the
network, which must be verified by other
nodes before being accepted by the net-
work. Once all verification stages are com-
plete, only then can the submitting node
commit the proposal, which in term ap-
pends a new time-sliced block of activities
to the global uniledger.
7.2 Proposal Creation
This example of a simplistic mecha-
nism for proposal creation is implemented,
and designed to be improved upon, and al-
low for custom agreement mechanisms to
be created.
Let us say we have a network with 2
nodes participating in the proposal. To ini-
tiate the protocol, we simply invoke either
node to produce the first proposal contain-
ing Bi = 0, this is our genesis block. To
elect a node responsible for creating the
next proposal, we define the function for
proposal creator election, PCE as
PCE(|N |, Bi) (1)
thus, mapping a natural cartesian square,
N2 to the node id set, N ,
PCE : N× N→ Ni (2)
where PCE maps the cardinality of the
set of network nodes participating in pro-
posal creator election, a natural number
N > 0, and the current block height, Bi,
another natural number, N > 0, to a node
id, or node index, also a natural number,
N > 0. N represents the set of nodes in
the network of whom are being considered
for creating the next proposal. From an
individual node’s perspective, this includes
all of its peers, and itself. The scheme also
assumes an ordered, and sequential set of
node ids. To physically calculate PCE,
PCE := ((Bi + 1) mod |N |) + 1 (3)
where we add 1 to Bi to represent the
next block id, and we add 1 to the result
assuming node ids, Nid begin at 1, not 0.
The node then checks for whether or not its
own node id, Nid, is equal to the result of
8
AfricaOS: a distributed, proposal-based, replicated state machine (RSM)
Figure 3: A proposal illustration, showing a chain of blocks being submitted by pro-
posals
PCE. Effectively, this is checking whether or
not Nid is congruent to the next Bi modulo
the cardinality of nodes being considered or
proposal creation, |N |.
Nid = (Bi + 1) (mod |N |) (4)
The node elected to create the next
proposal will always have a node id equal to
the result of PCE. This example is a round-
robin approach to proposal creation among
peers. Other methods for determining the
creator of the next proposal can also be
used instead of this basic example, both
collaborative and not collaborative.
7.3 Proposal State
The following states represent the
stages of Practical Byzantine Fault Toler-
ance (PBFT) used for proposal agreement
amongst participating nodes. This is a sim-
ple implementation of the PBFT protocol to
reach agreement among peers.
1. Created
2. Response
3. Resolution
The protocol uses these three states
to transition a submitted proposal through
the network for agreement consideration.
The physical implementation also has sub-
states to assist with intermediary compu-
tations, but these substates fall into one of
these main states, and may depend on the
physical implementation details.
Created
The created state coincides with pre-
prepare in PBFT, and signifies a node sub-
mitting a new proposal for consideration
amongst participating nodes in the net-
work.
Response
The response state coincides with pre-
pare in PBFT, and signifies a node inform-
ing the network of its acceptance or rejec-
tion of the submitted proposal. These re-
sponse messages are transmitted by every
node other than the node responsible for
creating of the newly submitted proposal.
Resolution
The resolution state represents a
node’s commitment of the submitted pro-
posal, as per the commit state of PBFT.
Every node participating in the agreement
mechanism for a submitted proposal trans-
mits a resolution signal to the rest of its
peers.
7.4 Proposal Agreement
The fundamental agreement mecha-
nism is inspired by PBFT [5]. This protocol
is not dependent on any specific agreement
mechanism, and can be implemented with
an arbitrary agreement protocol, although
network properties will differ with respect
to the agreement protocol chosen.
9
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PBFT
The PBFT agreement protocol follows
a "pre-prepare", "prepare", "commit" for-
mat. This is best illustrated by figure 4.
7.5 Proposal Verification
To verify a proposal, the process may
be different depending on the use case.
However, there are several common denom-
inators regarding the verification of a sub-
mitted proposal. For example, a node may
wish to check the hash between the sub-
mitted proposal, and the proposal exist-
ing before it was submitted, the previously
submitted proposal. Another criteria may
be to check if the submitted proposalid is
simply larger than the proposal last held
by the node. Although naive, this example
demonstrates a simple criteria that may or
may not be important for a given use case.
Due to the differences in how proposals
may be verified, and accepted, we demon-
strate creating a generalized Proposal Ver-
ification Function PVF.
PVF : P → {Accepted, Rejected} (5)
of which is physically implemented as,
PVF : P → {0, 1} (6)
with 0, and 1 representing invalid, and
valid proposals respectively.
Invalid Proposals
The cardinality of the set of reasons for
which a submitted proposal is not accepted
by peers is purposely minimal to mitigate
complexity issues. In simplistic terms, a
valid next proposal should have the correct
next block index, and a correct proposal
hash. A function to calculate the valid next
block index , VNBI is defined as
VNBI : P × N→ {0, 1} (7)
where the N is Bi, and valid proposal hash
as
VPH : P → {0, 1} (8)
This results in PVF being computed as
PVF := VNBI ∧ VPH (9)
This assumes the validity functions re-
turn 1 for valid proposals. If by physical
implementation, VNBI and VPH represent
functions that test for invalidity, meaning
they return 1 for invalid proposals, then
PVF is defined as
PVF := ¬(VNBI ∨ VPH) (10)
These two definitions are essentially repre-
senting the same logical outcome of pro-
posal validation.
7.6 Linking Proposals
Similar to how Bitcoin hashes a block
header, containing the hash of its parent
block header [4], we can link proposal his-
tory by hashing proposals. A proposal is
inadvertently linked to a parent proposal
because each block contains the hash of
the proposal from which it was submitted.
Thus, linking blocks, as covered in the next
section, also inherently links proposals.
Blocks in a chain
A shared ledger is the underlying
source of truth in Bitcoin, Ethereum, and
almost all (not all) modern blockchain-
based protocols, sometimes referred to as
satoshi-style blockchains. This system uses
the same concept for the same purpose, al-
though we abstract away the logical details
for generating blocks. This is because it
is irrelevant to the conveyance of this sys-
tem. An individual implementing group for
this project may differ in how they produce
blocks from another implementing group.
The mechanism by which blocks are pro-
duced is not an implementation-breaking
details for AOS.
10
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Figure 4: The protocol behavior for Practical Byzantine Fault tolerance (PBFT)
8.1 Defining a Block
Time in the system is committed by
creating time-sliced activity blocks, similar
to blocks in Ethereum [7], or Bitcoin [4].
These blocks are cryptographically linked,
and contain several important pieces of in-
formation. The included information can
include a timestamp, the block hash, the
node who committed the block, and the
hash of the proposal responsible for trig-
gering the block to be created, among other
pieces of information.
8.2 Creating Blocks
Depending on the decentralized pro-
tocol being examined, blocks are authored
differently within a protocol. In order to
take advantage of the nuances within the
decentralized protocol space, we wish to ex-
tend a generalized block generation func-
tion, Φ. Every proposal created contains
a proposed block within its body. Regard-
less of implementation, the definition of the
block production function is,
Φ : PBi → PBi+1 (11)
Whereby PBcurrent contains the block pro-
duced, Bi+1. Here we index proposals by
the block index in contains.
8.3 Linking Blocks
In a similar fashion to Bitcoin, and
hashed linked lists, each block is crypto-
graphically included in the hash of its child
block. The purpose of hashing any data,
D, and including any other data, D′, while
hashing D, is to cryptographically prove
D′ must have existed before D – this is a
property of composition.
Hash( Hash(B−1header ) ) (12)
Essentially, this is the same as the compos-
ite function,
(H ◦ H) (B−1header ) (13)
and effectively proves that the inner hash
function of B−1header has to exist before
the outer hash function is called (assuming
B−1header is used in the hash). The amount
of time that provably exists between the
two functions being invoked is preserved,
assuming we can prove the amount of time
existing between the inner and outer func-
tions.
Transactions
The limited capability of transactions
from Bitcoin has led to modernization of
decentralized protocols. This moderniza-
tion has brought about the heavy usage
and adoption of smart contracts. However,
contrary to popular belief, more advanced
capabilities were always able to be com-
puted by Bitcoin Script [4], provided a de-
veloper could write the desired operation
into the simple scripting language, Bitcoin
Script. Nevertheless, Ethereum (and other
protocols using smart contracts) have rein-
troduced to developers the concept that
transactions for a protocol should be able
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to perform any turing complete piece of
functionality.
Figure 5: Components of a standard
transaction
It is due to this that AOS abstracts away
the behavior of transactions. We general-
ize two types of transactions. One set of
transactions, Type A, act as transactions
submitted to the chain that await invoca-
tion from other transactions, and another
set of transactions, Type B, that are also
submitted to the chain that invoke Type A
transactions.
9.1 Transaction Types
In Bitcoin, using Unspent Transac-
tion Output (UTXO), Type A transactions
are called outputs, and Type B transac-
tions are called Inputs [4]. With Ethereum,
Type A are contract creation transaction
types, and Type B are Message Calls [7].
With Kunta, the protocol abstracts away
transaction types, with Type A being fe-
male transactions, and Type B being male
transactions [8]. Nevertheless, these two
transaction types facilitate the nuances in
behavior among all transactions handled
by the system. Each transaction changes
the state of the system, and each transac-
tion type alters the state of the system in
different ways.
9.2 Signing
Every transaction submitted is signed
by the sender using their private key, while
their corresponding public key is public
knowledge. The sender then encrypts the
transaction using the public key belonging
to the intended recipient.
Whenever the intended recipient of the
transaction attempts to invoke the transac-
tion directed to them, the recipient must
first decrypt the transaction using their
own private key, proving they own the key,
of which is paired with the key used to en-
crypt the data on the first pass. This re-
sults in message signed by the sender. The
intended recipient then verifies the transac-
tion was sent by the actual sender by using
the sender’s public key for verification of
the decrypted signature – this scheme en-
sures two things:
1. The only peer allowed to invoke the
transaction must own the private key
corresponding to the public key used
to encrypt the transaction
2. The peer who decrypts the transaction
can verify the transaction was not sent
by a peer who does not possess the
private key used to initially sign the
transaction
9.3 Transaction Algebra
Conventionally, developers design a
virtual machine with opcodes dedicated
to the execution upon submitted transac-
tions. This section contains examples of us-
ing quasi -boolean expressions to compute
upon transactions, opposed to creating an
arbitrary virtual machine for the task, as
in Bitcoin [4], Ethereum [7], Kunta [8], and
other decentralized protocols.
Example 1
The most simple example of a Female
transaction, Txf , is a transaction contain-
ing an element from the binary set, {0, 1}.
A corresponding Male transaction, Txm,
contains an element from the same set as
well. Intuitively, this represents a situation
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where the sender of Txf is signaling their
willingness to do something, or a "yes" rep-
resented asA. This is a truth value of True.
The corresponding Txm, also containing a
1, signals to the function their willingness,
to do something, or a "yes". The boolean
function as a whole is
A×B (14)
Intuitively the function reads as "A
and B", AB, or A ∧ B. The intuition of
what the function result means to the net-
work participants can be arbitrary. An ex-
ample would be to transfer the ownership
of an asset, controlled by the transaction,
from A to B.
Figure 6: Transaction example 1, A×B,
transaction represented as a boolean cir-
cuit
Example 2
This example uses a numerical value
of units (which could represent a mone-
tary value). This function would return the
value to be subtracted from the senders ac-
count by using a conjunction on two vari-
ables, each submitted by a peer, and mul-
tiplying the truth value, {0, 1}, by the sub-
traction result. The amount to subtract is
represented here by ∆. The following are
equivalent:
A(B + C)×∆ (15)
∆(A(B + C)) (16)
∆(AB +AC) (17)
with × representing multiplication, not
the cartesian product, as both operands are
not sets; A(B+C) is a truth value, and ∆
is a numerical value, a scalar. The ∆ would
only be subtracted if A submits a confirma-
tion, and either B or C submit confirma-
tions. This results in ∆ being multiplied
by 1, otherwise it is multiplied by zero, re-
sulting in 0 units being added to the recip-
ient’s account, and zero being subtracted
from the sender’s account.
Figure 7: Transaction example 2, A(B +
C), transaction represented as a boolean
circuit
Example 3
To create an election, and compute votes,
v, submitted by a user, u, for a ballot, b,
each vote is an element in V .
uvb ∈ Vb → {uvb} ∪ Vb (18)
where, v ∈ {0, 1}. Votes from a user, for a
ballot is
uvb =
{
1, if uvb = 1
0, otherwise
An aggregate function to compute the
votes can be,
f(b) =
|Vb|∑
u=1
uvb (19)
where |Vb| is the total votes for b, uvb is
the value corresponding to a vote from u
for b. Finally, we index v, by b, vb, for a
ballot, where b ∈ B, with B being the set
of all candidates. To complete an election,
if all candidates must confirm election re-
sults, the winner, w, is defined by
w = argmax
b
f(b) (20)
and the transaction logic simply is
w(ABC...n) (21)
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where A, B, C, etc are the confirmations of
individual candidates/ballots. The winner
is then Bw(ABC...n).
Implementation would be a transaction
containing a placeholder for a single value.
The single value would be a bit, represent-
ing a vote, {0, 1}, initially set to 0. If we
represent it as a circuit, we could use an
inverter on the negation of the bit, shown
in figure 8, which is logically equivalent to
just taking the value of the bit. For illus-
trative purposes, A just represents a value
stored in a transaction.
Figure 8: Transaction example 3, A,
transaction represented as a boolean cir-
cuit
Conjunction
We perform a conjunction between
transaction examples 1, and 2 above, (t1,t2
respectively), by,
RABC ≡ At1Bt1 ∧At2(Bt2 + Ct2) (22)
this truth value is True only if both trans-
actions are true.
RABC ×∆ (23)
The output of the boolean statements
are used as variables in the algebraic state-
ment. In this example illustrated, the re-
turn value of the entire transaction con-
junction would be the amount subtracted
from the sender’s account, and added to
the recipient’s account. Using these two
layers of algebra, we can compute logic for
single transactions, and multiple transac-
tions.
9.4 Designing Mechanisms
To keep it simple, we focus on two-
party mechanisms. We say Agent i, Ai,
represents one of two diametrically op-
posed parties, and acts as a lobbyist.
The agent will experience political pressure
from the parties they represent. The politi-
cal pressure functions are the diametrically
opposed functions.
Figure 9: The interaction between two
agents, A, through mechanism M
Illustrated in figure 10, we define a gen-
eral mechanism with two diametrically op-
posed agent p-functions. We refer to the
functions Pi, political action functions, or
p-functions. For simplicity, we treat the
p-functions as primitives; we make two as-
sumptions about them. First, we assume
that the function P1 takes values in the in-
terval [10]
[τ imin, τ
i
max] (24)
where i = 1,2, since there are two agents.
The value τ is the output of the environ-
ment, fromM , or the output of the mecha-
nism, given the responses from the agents,
A. A p-function, P1, is uniquely specified
by two numbers, a1, and a2. Similarly, P2
is characterized by two numbers, b1, and
b2. Thus, an environment consists of a pos-
sible pair of functions (P1, P2). It is spec-
ified by four numbers, θ = (a1, a2, b1, b2).
The set, Θ = Θ1 × Θ2 of environments is
the set of all θ = (θ1, θ2) that satisfy these
conditions
τ1max > a1 > a2 > τ
1
min (25)
and
τ2min < b1 < b2 < τ
2
max (26)
Thus,
Θ1 = {(a1, a2) : τ1max > a1 > a2 > τ1min}
(27)
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Figure 10: Abstract representation of a mechanism, M , between two diametrically
opposed agents, and their environment. λ is the value controlled by the mechanism,
where a, and b are the private messages from the agents to M
and
Θ2 = {(b1, b2) : τ2min < b1 < b2 < τ2max}
(28)
The job of M is to accept input from
both agents, a, and b. Value a is a set
containing elements in the codomain of the
p-function for A1. In the simple sense,
a ≡ {a1, a2} (29)
and a is the response of A1 to M return-
ing λ. Note that each p-function, is ei-
ther monotonically increasing, or monoton-
ically decreasing. This is convenient in or-
der for the p-functions to be diametrically
opposed.
M for Pricing
For example, we say the mechanism,
M regulates the price of good, g, for an ex-
change of g from agent 1 to agent 2. For a
buyer and a seller, the price of g can be set
by buyers. However the price can also be
set by a mechanism. The buyer and seller
serve as the two diametrically opposed par-
ties, since the buyer wants to minimize
price, and the seller wants to maximize it.
The diametrically opposed p-functions
represent the political pressures exerted
Figure 11: Mechanism for seller, Mseller,
where λ is the price of the good being
exchanged. At λ = 1, the price be-
comes 100% of the buyer’s reserves, or
the seller’s/market’s perceived value of the
good, g
upon the agents, by the buyer and seller
of g. If λ, the price of g in the transaction,
is 0, the political pressure felt by the seller
will be high, but the buyer will be elated
at g being free, feeling little or no pressure.
Once a value of λ is proposed by M , a and
b both report their p-function values at λ.
In this example, the goal function is to bal-
ance, or optimize λ. This is just an ex-
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ample goal function over both p-functions,
and much more advanced goal functions
can be constructed using the same princi-
ples.
Figure 11 shows the p-function for the
seller of g. When λ takes the value of 0,
the political pressure felt by the agent rep-
resenting the seller is maximal. Intuitively,
this is because the seller of g is not econom-
ically incentivized to give g away for free.
When λ takes the value of 1, this repre-
sents the price of g being equivalent to the
buyer’s total reserves. The opposition to
this p-function is the p-function of agent 2,
a2, of which is representing the buyer. If λ
is 1, then the political pressure imposed by
the buyer onto a2 is maximal. τ2max can be
viewed as 100% of the value of g, or 100%
of the buyer’s reserves.
9.5 Use in privacy
With several approaches towards han-
dling privacy, of which do not have to be
mutually exclusive. However, we examine
them both independently.
Confidential Transactions
Hiding information in a transaction
would occur by masking true information
with blinding factors from the algebraic
statements. By doing this, onlookers can-
not feasibly know the variables used in the
computation without the involved parties
revealing the information. For example, A
could represent something sensitive for a
node, but since the value is in R, it can be
hidden by several combinations of masking,
and abstraction.
If we have boolean statements, the size
of the search space for a nefarious peer
would be proportional to the amount of
variables in the statements. Each variable
can only be from the set {0, 1}. With 2
variables, the peer would have to guess 22
combinations.
A security margin is a measure of the
required effort needed to break a systems
security measure(s) – estimating the hard-
ness of breaking the system. If you have a
high enough security margin, the nefarious
actor may not have the opportunity to per-
form the necessary amount of attempts to
correctly guess the blinding factors, as they
may be penalized, punished, or blocked af-
ter 0 < a < 4 attempts.
One method to circumvent this is to
add variables to the statements, while the
sender, and receiver know the correct nega-
tions to be made. This yields 2n combina-
tions for the bad actor to guess. This can
be used for components of the computa-
tion executed upon during a state change
caused by a transaction being invoked. Fol-
lowing the scheme set forth by Pedersen,
[6], the commiter commits themself to an
s ∈ Zq by choosing t ∈ Zq at random and
computing
E(s, t) = gsht (30)
Such a commitment can later be
opened by revealing s and t. It is very
easy to prove and show that E(s, t) reveals
no information about s, and that the com-
mitter cannot open a commitment to s as
s′ 6= s unless he can find logg(h). For
any s ∈ Zq, and for randomly uniformly
chosen t ∈ Zq, E(s, t) is uniformly dis-
tributed in the group Gq. Once the com-
miter makes E(s, t) public, and reveals s
and t, the verifier is given E(s, t), s, and
t. The verifier can then check the commit-
ment for integrity. The integrity of E(s, t)
holds as long as the commiter adheres to
the scheme. This scheme can be used to
add a layer of privacy to a transaction.
Differential Privacy
Modeled after randomized processes
known as randomized response, Differential
privacy [12] is useful for computing approx-
imations over populations. For example,
to compute an approximation of whether
or not a population of people in a coun-
try prefer option A, the higher our sample
size, the more we can tolerate untruthful
answers from respondents.
Regarding decentralized protocols, we
can only tolerate approximations for a sub-
set of problems. There exists another sub-
set of problems for which we must com-
16
AfricaOS: a distributed, proposal-based, replicated state machine (RSM)
pute deterministic truths. RSMs typi-
cally execute deterministic virtual machine
(VM) computations upon parameters, val-
ues, and operations.
By using differential privacy, privacy
comes from the plausible deniability of any
outcome [12]. Accuracy comes from an un-
derstanding of the noise generation proce-
dure. Non-triviality says that there exists
a query and two databases that yield dif-
ferent outputs under this query. Changing
one row at a time we see there exists a pair
of databases differing only in the value of a
single row, on which the same query yields
different outputs. An adversary knowing
that the database is one of these two al-
most identical databases learns the value
of the data in the unknown row. Also, dif-
ferential privacy does not guarantee that
what one believes to be one’s secrets will
remain secret.
A mechanism for differentially private
transactions can be viewed from various
perspectives. For example, If we wish to
provide -differential privacy for a transac-
tion, we would have to have a set of trans-
actions that may be invalid, or generated
by the privacy mechanism. This would en-
able participants with plausible deniability
regarding whether or not a transaction be-
longing to them has been generated by the
privacy mechanism, or themselves directly.
Say  be a positive real number, R, and
A be an algorithm, chosen at random, that
expects a dataset as input. Let imA be
the image of A. The algorithm A provides
-differential privacy if, for all datasets, D1
andD2, differing only on on a single record,
and all subsets S of imA:
Pr[A(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp () · Pr[A(D2) ∈ S],
(31)
If a participant’s transaction is in ei-
ther database, D, the participants can
claim the transaction is not truthful. This
is only one approach to applying differen-
tial privacy to transactions directly. Other
schemes may include applying -differential
privacy to the computations themselves,
and not the transaction as a whole.
Further work
Moving forward, this protocol supports
custom block production functions, agree-
ment mechanisms, and transaction invo-
cation functions to be implemented. The
goal of this work is to satisfy the minimum
requirements suitable to implement a dis-
tributed protocol for proposal agreement.
With this system, groups can create their
own markets, with their own rules, using
a system built with a minimum amount
of constraints necessary to generate dis-
tributed economic collaboration, and com-
merce. This system is intentionally devel-
oped to be built upon, by us, and other
research teams.
10.1 Research Horizon
Since scientific work is ever-expanding,
the items on our horizon fall into two cate-
gories. privacy, and customization. These
categories are independent of the standard
enhancements forthcoming for software-
based development projects.
Privacy
Several items on our research horizon
pertain to guarantees of privacy. Mainly,
using arguments from ignorance to en-
hance privacy capabilities of a system. Pri-
vacy is a big concern, and we wish to
enhance this work by experimenting with
the tradeoffs between enhanced privacy,
the message-space size, compute time, and
storage space required (disk and memory).
There are several research teams working
on this, both in pure theory, and in prac-
tice. Our implementation of confidential
transactions is but only one example of us-
ing arguments from knowledge.
Universally Modular
Another goal of this work is to mitigate
conflicts of implementation. There exists a
subset of implementers who wish to control
parameter(s) of the RSM. Maximizing the
parameters allowed to be extended, and al-
tered, without sacrificing underlying secu-
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rity features is a primary goal. There also
exists an opportunity to extend develop-
ment powers to developers for the underly-
ing security features themselves. It is com-
mon for a protocol in this space to guard
their underlying protocol features, opposed
to embracing customization. In this spirit,
we build from methodologies demonstrated
in the Kunta paper [8].
Developer Friendliness
The definition of Developer Friendli-
ness should be widely reexamined. Sim-
ply because a project is open source, does
not automatically translate into the same
project being developer friendly. Devel-
oper friendliness is a measure of how much
the project has taken into account the av-
erage developer using the tools used in the
project.
This includes the programming lan-
guage, and the efficiency of the average de-
veloper using it. It is good if a project is
open source, but it is suboptimal if the es-
oteric nature of the code base confuses de-
velopers wishing to customize its core fea-
tures. More work is needed to be done
if the industry is to make the code bases
of decentralized protocols more developer
friendly.
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